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Abstract 
 
Effectively measuring variation in institutions over time and across jurisdictions is important for 
examining how institutional characteristics shape political, social and economic issues. We present 
a new dataset of American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) constitutions and a new approach 
for measuring variation in polities using machine learning techniques. Existing data on AIAN 
institutions have largely been based on costly and time-consuming expert coding and survey 
approaches, where the end product will become obsolete once institutions change. Our automated 
content analysis of AIAN constitutional documents allows for more flexible and customizable 
measurement of the variation, using a larger corpus of data than existing approaches, limited by 
data collection and coding costs. We consider variation in judicial institutions, previously shown 
to play a crucial role in AIAN development, and compare our machine-coded measures to existing 
hand-coded data for a sample of 97 American Indian constitutions. We show that machine coding 
replicates expert coded data. Our approach can be easily extended to other topics, including the 
executive, and shows the potential of automated measures to complement or confirm traditional 
coding of political institutions. 
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Introduction 
Effectively measuring variation in institutions over time and across jurisdictions is important to 
scholars who study how institutional characteristics shape political, social and economic issues 
including development, the rule of law, and change in political institutions. We present a new 
dataset of American Indian nations constitutions and polities to contribute to the discussion on 
measuring institutions. Political scientists have long neglected the study of American Indian and 
Alaska Native (AIAN) nations (Ferguson, 2016), even though the pressures these communities 
face reflect important issues including poverty and inequality. US 2014 census estimates indicate 
that 28.3% of single-race AIAN individuals lived in poverty; ‘the highest rate of any race group’.1 
Variation in AIAN polities can provide unique information on how the development of political 
institutions can shape local political, social and economic outcomes. 
Previous studies have investigated how AIAN institutions influence various governance 
outcomes (e.g. Akee et al., 2015; Cornell & Kalt, 1995a, 1995b, 2000; Dippel, 2014; Gover, 2010). 
However, they have generally relied on measures of institutions developed by costly and time-
consuming expert coding and surveys. Crucially, such data are static and will become outdated if 
institutions change; a serious concern as many AIAN nations have pursued reforms. The California 
Valley Miwok Tribe, for example, has amended its constitutions at least six times since 1999.  
We present an original digitalized database of American Indian constitutions. Our data 
allows us to code and measure institutional characteristics directly from the content of 
constitutions. We demonstrate the value of this data, using a text-as-data approach to analyze the 
content of 97 American Indian constitutions. We use a dictionary approach and supervised 
 
1 https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/newsroom/facts-for-features/2015/cb15-ff22_AIAN_month.pdf 
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machine learning to construct institutional measures of AIAN polities. We focus on judiciary 
institutions as this is considered essential for AIAN nations’ stability and development (Cornell & 
Kalt, 2000). 
Our analysis demonstrates that machine coded approaches applied to constitutional texts 
recover well the results from expert coding of judiciary functions and guarantees of judicial 
independence. Our approach allows for more comprehensive measures of AIAN institutional 
variation, using a larger corpus than existing approaches limited by high data coding costs. The 
use of automated approaches to analyze the content of AIAN constitutions is fully reproducible, 
analyses can be updated whenever the underlying documents are amended or new information 
becomes available, and the analytical approach can easily be expanded to other topics in 
constitutions including the executive. Our analysis highlights the general value of using automated 
approaches to measure political institutions. Although expert surveys and hand coding remain 
valuable for identifying institutional characteristics, automated measures are a viable alternative 
and supplement to traditional coding practices. This is reinforced by Marquardt (2020) and Krüger 
and Nordås (2020) in this volume, who discuss and propose solutions to improve on possible 
measurement error, given the propensity for expert coders to disagree or diverge. 
 
Comparative perspectives on constitutions 
Worldwide constitutions 
There is a large body of work on measuring political institutions using constitutions and their 
effects. Tsebelis & Nardi (2014) argue that longer country constitutions are associated with lower 
GDP per capita because detailed constitutions prevent governments from adopting measures to 
combat economic shocks. Moreover, detailed constitutions are amended more frequently because 
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they are more likely to contain restrictive provisions that impede the government’s ability to pass 
necessary or desired legislation.  
 Focusing on judicial institutions in constitutional texts, Melton & Ginsburg (2014) analyze 
the relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence. They find that constitutions 
that outline the selection and removal of judges enhance judicial independence in practice, using 
the Comparative Constitutions Project data. Hayo & Voigt (2007) similarly argue that judicial 
independence vested in formal rule enhances effectiveness, as measured by average term length of 
judges, number of judges, constant income of judges, changes to legal rules, and statements on 
degree of judicial independence.  
 
AIAN constitutions 
A number of studies examine how constitutional characteristics and institutions affects 
governance, policy, and social and economic outcomes in AIAN nations. Cornell & Kalt (2000) 
argue that self-governing AIAN institutions and ‘cultural match’, or the closeness of adopted 
political institutions to indigenous cultural norms, are key to economic development. They classify 
whether there is an independent judiciary and whether the government is organized under a strong 
chief executive, a strong legislature, or a general council for 70 AIAN constitutions (Cornell & 
Kalt, 1995b: 17). They find that AIAN nations with a strong-chief-executive and strong-
legislatures display higher economic development than nations with general councils, which they 
attribute to the greater separation of powers. Additionally, Cornell & Kalt (1991) show that nations 
with an independent judiciary and directly-elected chief executive have almost 20% higher 
employment than those without an independent judiciary or those governed by general council. 
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The cultural match of constitutional design matters for economic development because of 
perceptions of legitimacy of government, as suggested in Cornell & Kalt’s (1995a) qualitative 
analysis of the White Mountain Apache of the Fort Apache Reservation in Arizona and the Oglala 
Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. Even though both nations have 
adopted constitutions based on the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), their pre-constitutional 
governmental forms differ considerably regarding the structure, scope, location and source of 
political authority, with the Apache nation having greater cultural match to their constitution and 
better levels of economic development than the Sioux. 
Akee et al. (2015) explore the institutional differences between AIAN nations who adopted 
tribal constitutions during Republican versus Democrat presidential administrations and the long-
term economic effects. They code constitutions of 70 American Indian nations based on whether 
the executive is indirectly elected, the tribal council is directly elected, an independent judiciary 
exists, staggered elections can be found, and the term length or size of tribal council. Nations that 
adopted constitutions under a Democrat administration tended to implement an indirectly elected 
(i.e. parliamentary) chief executive, and nations that adopted constitutions under a Republican 
administration tended to implement a directly elected (i.e. presidential) chief executive – with 
higher economic development under the former. 
These studies shed valuable light on AIAN constitutional texts, but the measurement coding 
procedure is costly and time-consuming, and it is difficult to replicate the coding decisions for 
individual constitutions. In the following, we explore how a text-as-data approach can complement 
existing approaches. 
 
AIAN constitution making  
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AIAN constitutions embody the foundational principles of AIAN nations, defining the structure, 
functions and authority of their institutions and branches of government (Flies-Away et al., 2007). 
Miller (2011: 17) argues that ‘a close examination of [AIAN] constitutions demonstrates the 
different powers that tribal governments exercise under their constitutions and the different ways 
in which tribal communities have chosen to create and control their governments’. There is 
considerable variation in both the content and origin of contemporary AIAN constitutions.  
Some AIAN nations already maintained constitutional documents before the 1934 IRA, 
but many adopted constitutions based on an outline of topics (Rusco, 2000: 305n7) or model 
constitution (Wilkins, 2004: xxiii), provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).2 The drafting 
of IRA-era constitutions reflected an attempt by the US government to decrease federal control of 
American Indian affairs and to increase self-governance.  
The IRA intended to provide American Indian nations ‘with the modern governments that 
would allow them to participate more fully in democratic, American-style political processes’ 
(Lemont, 2006: 19). IRA constitutions typically provide for a representative tribal council with 
legislative powers, tribal chairperson directly or indirectly elected, little or no provision for judicial 
institutions/functions, little enumeration of powers of the various parts of government, and a 
requirement that the BIA approve any changes (Cornell & Kalt, 1995b). American Indian nations 
were given two years to vote on the act’s provisions, with 181 tribes accepting the act and 77 tribes 
 
2 Cohen (1971) notes that the Department of Interior had over 60 AIAN nations’ constitutions on record before 1934. Since many 
constitutions reflect IRA outlines, the documents may share similar content, even if many have subsequently been revised. 
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rejecting it (Wilkins & Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, 2011).3 It is estimated that 35-40% of AIAN 
nations now govern under an IRA constitution, with the remainder having a non-IRA constitution 
in place or operating without a written constitution (Miller, 2011). 
Following the adoption of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act in 
1975, AIAN nations were provided greater opportunities to manage local government and local 
issues in law and practice (Akee et al., 2015). Many AIAN nations have subsequently revised 
initial constitutions to be ‘both practically effective in meeting the challenges and circumstances 
the nation faces and culturally legitimate in the eyes of the people’ (Kalt, 2007: 109).  
 
AIAN constitutional database and sample 
We have collected and digitalized a machine-readable database of AIAN constitutional documents. 
This corpus allows for systematic analysis of the content and sources of constitutional change, 
including the extent to which AIAN nations are able to adapt constitutions depending on specific 
challenges or circumstances, or revise the content of IRA-era constitutions.   
The availability of AIAN constitutions, amendments and codes varies considerably. Many 
documents are available through the National Indian Law Library (NILL), although not all are 
digitalized. Gover’s (2010) collection also helped us locate past and present constitutional source 
material.  We retrieved newer constitutions from the official AIAN websites where available. Yet, 
not all tribes share their constitutional texts, and not all tribal jurisdictions actually have 
constitutions. Additionally, we ordered and scanned many documents from different libraries.  Our 
 
3 American Indian nations in Oklahoma and Alaska Native nations were originally excluded, but the 1936 Alaska Act and the 
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act extended the IRA to all federally recognized AIAN nations (Wilkins & Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, 
2011). 
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AIAN constitutional database includes over 2,700 tribal constitutions, amendments, codes, 
treaties, and further legal documents.  
In this study we only consider AIAN polities with constitutions, American Indian 
constitutions in the lower 48 US states, and do not include Alaska Native and Hawaii indigenous 
nations. We exclude secondary codes or laws. As of February 2019, there were 573 federally 
recognized tribal entities in the United states, 342 within the contiguous 48 states (and 231 in 
Alaska), with some tribes jointly administering jurisdiction (Bureau of Indian Affairs, 2019). We 
focus only on active constitutions in 2010 before adoption of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 
2010. This law enabled tribes to adopt greater sentencing powers and may have triggered changes 
that would make comparisons to previous analyses of AIAN constitutions challenging. This leaves 
us with a sample of 97 American Indian constitutions. 
Figure 1 displays the adoption year of constitutions in our sample. The oldest active 
constitution, approved in 1935, is the Santa Clara Pueblo, New Mexico, and the most recent 
constitution, approved in 2010, is the Absentee-Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma, who we record as 
amending their original constitution twice. Most constitutions in our sample were adopted during 
the 1980s through to the 2000s (67 constitutions, 69%) – with the greatest number adopted in the 
2000s (31 constitutions, 32%), and the lowest number adopted in the 1950s and 2010 (3 
constitutions respectively, 6%). 
 
Figure 1 in here 
 
 
Methodology and data 
Automated content analysis 
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Recent innovations in machine learning and increased digitalization of texts have made automated 
text analysis widely used in political science. These methods help researchers analyze large 
corpuses of texts and provide opportunities to replicate human coding in a more systematic and 
timely manner. Computerized approaches can be used to estimate actors’ ideal points from 
political texts or organize and classify documents into pre-defined or new categories (Grimmer & 
Stewart, 2013). For example, Laver et al. (2003) and Slapin & Proksch (2008) use word 
frequencies in party manifestos to estimate location on a policy spectrum. Owens & Wedeking 
(2011) and Benoit, Munger & Spirling (2019) develop approaches to measure the complexity of 
texts such as Supreme Court opinions using specific dictionaries and human pairwise judgment 
data that capture cognitive complexity, sophistication and difficulty. Scholars have used a variety 
of text sources, including online blogs, social media data, speeches and newspaper articles 
(Hopkins & King, 2010; Schrodt & Brackle, 2013; King et al., 2013; Jamal et al., 2015). 
To our knowledge, we are the first to apply machine learning techniques to AIAN 
constitutional texts. Spirling (2012) uses a text-as-data approach to analyze treaties between Native 
American nations and the US government from 1784-1911 and the impact of institutional change 
and relative power. He finds that treaties became harsher overtime, particularly during the mid-
1820s when the US gained power and during war when the US government gained military 
strength that facilitated stronger demands.  
 
Text data processing 
To pre-process the documents, we converted all AIAN constitutions to plain text files (UTF-8). 
We convert all text to lower case and remove unnecessary white space, punctuation, encoded text 
and non-ascii characters, and stem the text using the Porter (1980) algorithm to reduce words to 
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their base root form (e.g. ‘judges’ is condensed to ‘judg’). This helps to remove aspects of the text 
irrelevant to our analysis and avoid over-counting the same terms and concepts (e.g. capitalized 
and stringed variations of words). We use this text for calculating the word count of terms included 
in our dictionaries. To improve the efficiency of our supervised machine learning model, we 
remove all numbers and stop words (e.g. ‘are’, ‘at’, ‘by’, ‘from’, ‘that’, ‘the’). 
 
Exploring American Indian constitutions  
Constitution length 
We first compare the total length of constitutions (i.e. total word count). For this purpose, we create 
a document term matrix (DTM) that counts the number of times a term appears in each of the 
constitutions. The columns in the DTM correspond to the unique words and the rows correspond 
to the American Indian constitution. We then take the sum of each row to calculate the total word 
count of the constitution. 
The constitutions in our corpus vary considerably in overall length. For example, the St. 
Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin has the shortest constitution in our sample (approved in 
1942) with only 1,423 words, seven articles and three bylaws. By contrast, the 1992 Menominee 
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin constitution is nearly thirteen times longer, with 18,406 words based on 
20 articles and six bylaws. The average length of a constitution in our sample is 5,410 words. 
Figure 2 displays the distribution of constitution length in our sample. 
 
Figure 2 in here 
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Figure 3 displays the average word count of constitutions by decade adopted. On average, 
constitutions adopted from 1980-2010 were 28% longer than constitutions adopted during the 
earlier years in our sample. In general, we observe a steady increase in average length over time – 
with constitutions produced in 2010 on average 20% longer than constitutions produced during 
the 1930s. However, this growth is not entirely consistent as constitutions adopted during the 
1930s in our sample were on average 29-40% longer than those adopted during the 1940s and 
1950s. Using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we find a statistically significant increase in the 
average word count from constitutions produced over 1935-1969 to those produced during 1976-
2010 at the 99% confidence level. This suggests that the length of constitutions matters and length 
of newly adopted American Indian constitutions has increased over time. However, the change in 
average word count is only statistically significant at the 99% confidence level for constitutions 
produced during the 1930s and 1940s. 
 
Figure 3 in here 
 
Complexity of judicial institutions 
We measure the depth and breadth of judicial laws via two methods. First, we measure the length 
of a constitution’s section on the judiciary by segmenting this section from the main body. We 
then create a DTM that counts the number of times a term appears in each of the constitutions and 
take the sum of each row to calculate the word count for each judiciary section. Second, we build 
a dictionary of terms associated with the judiciary and create a DTM that counts the number of 
times a term in the dictionary appears in the constitution and take the sum of each row (see Table 
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I).4 We select our terms using existing dictionaries that define and provide synonyms for the term 
‘judiciary’ and include any relevant terms from our corpus that contain their base root form (e.g. 
‘law’, ‘bylaw’, ‘unlaw’). To ensure that these terms are relevant to the discussion of AIAN judicial 
institutions and account for variation in language and topics across constitutions, we only include 
those terms that feature in multiple constitutions in the sample. 
 
Table I in here 
 
There is considerable variation in the judicial section length of constitutions in our corpus. 
For example, 52% of constitutions do not have a dedicated section on the judiciary. The longest 
section on the judiciary in our sample is the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians of North 
Dakota’s constitution (approved in 2006) which consists of 1,766 words – containing information 
on the purpose of the judiciary, the establishment, judicial powers, the selection of judges, the 
judicial board, implementation and saving clause and reservation powers of the tribal council. The 
tribe with the shortest judicial section in their constitution (excluding tribes who do not have one) 
is the Lower Sioux Indian Community in Minnesota (approved in 2007) at 46 words. The 
information included in this section simply states that the council establishes a court of domestic 
relations to handle all misdemeanors, disputes and maintenance of law and order on the 
reservation. Figure 4 displays the distribution of judicial section length (i.e. word count) in our 
sample across tribes, with a mean of 231 words. 
 
 
4 For alternative measures of textual complexity see Owens & Wedeking (2011) and Benoit et al. (2019). 
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Figure 4 in here 
 
To account for the possibility that an AIAN nation does not have a specified judicial section 
but mentions the judicial function somewhere else in the constitution, we explore the word count 
of terms associated with our judiciary dictionary. We observe substantial variation. For example, 
for the St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, the terms included in our judiciary dictionary 
appear only 8 times in the constitution (approved in 1942). The Menominee of Wisconsin unit has 
the greatest amount of terms associated with the judiciary in the constitution (approved in 1992), 
with terms in dictionary appearing 286 times. Figure 5 displays the distribution of the number of 
terms included in our judicial dictionary appearing in a constitution with a mean value of 57.  
 
Figure 5 in here 
 
Judicial independence 
We measure levels of judicial independence by building a dictionary of terms associated with an 
independent judiciary including statements on judicial independence, judicial authority, judicial 
tenure, the selection and removal of judges, and salary insulation (see Table II). We construct our 
dictionary by selecting terms that correspond to the measures of judicial independence presented 
by Melton & Ginsburg (2014) (developed by the Comparative Constitutions Project) and Hayo & 
Voigt (2007). Namely, judicial independence, judicial tenure, selection procedure, removal 
procedure, limited removal conditions, and salary insulation. We then create a DTM that counts 
the number of times a term in the dictionary appears in the judiciary section of an American Indian 
constitution and take the sum of each row.  
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Table II in here 
 
 We again find significant variation on this measure in our sample. Since 52% of the 
constitutions in our sample do not have a dedicated section in their constitution on the judiciary, 
this group of tribes score a 0 on this measure. The Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewas of North 
Dakota includes the greatest number of references to an independent judiciary (with terms in our 
judicial independence dictionary appearing in the judicial section 93 times). Their constitution 
approved in 2006 mentions the term ‘independ’ 3 times, ‘elect’ 24 times and ‘term’ 11 times. In 
comparison, the tribes with the least amount of terms included in our judicial independence 
dictionary appearing in a judicial section (excluding tribes which do not have one) is the Lower 
Sioux Indian Community in Minnesota and the Tule River of the Tule River Reservation in 
California. The only term included in our dictionary that appears in their constitution approved in 
2007 and 1974 is ‘author’ just once. Figure 6 displays the distribution of the number of terms 
included in our independent judicial dictionary appearing in the judicial section of a constitution, 
with a mean value of 9. 
Unpacking the constitutions qualitatively helps illustrate the validity of our measure. If we 
compare constitutions which are in the 80th percentile of our judicial independence measure with 
those at the 60th percentile, a clear difference becomes apparent in how detailed judiciary 
independence is specified. The constitutions in the 60th percentile contain topics in their judiciary 
section such as definition of the establishment of judicial institutions, selection procedure and 
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number of judges.5 Constitutions in the 80th percentile contain all of those topics, but also include 
topics such as salary insulation, limitations to removal procedures, and the power for judges to 
review and hold to account the actions of the governing council.6   
 
Figure 6 in here 
 
Table A1 (see Online appendix) illustrates three American Indian constitutions that our 
judicial independence dictionary model identifies as having some of the least, average, and most 
references to an independent judiciary in the judicial section of their constitution. The Yankton 
Sioux Tribe of South Dakota has a constitution with the least information on the judicial function 
(except for a short passage relating to the selection procedure of judges). The Turtle Mountain 
Band of Chippewa Indians in North Dakota has a constitution with the most topic coverage on the 
structure of the judiciary (except on the topic of salary insulation). Table A1 also demonstrates the 
substantive differences in institutional design. For example, the Mescalero Apache Tribe in New 
Mexico selects judges through the judicial council (indirectly elected) and the Turtle Mountain 
Band of Chippewa Indians in North Dakota selects judges through a general population vote 
(directly elected).  
There is striking variation on section length, judiciary dictionary and judicial independence 
dictionary measures. While unfortunately outside the remit of this article, these measures will 
provide researchers with new opportunities to explore how various social, economic and political 
 
5 For instance, constitutional documents of the Chippewa Cree Indians of the Rocky Boys Reservation, the Sisseton-Wahpeton 
Oyate, or the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe of the Lower Brule Reservation. 
6 For instance, constitutional documents of the Ely Shoshone Tribe, or the Sac and Fox Nation. 
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outcomes are shaped by the structure and content of AIAN constitutions, which previous research 
suggests matter greatly (e.g. Cornell & Kalt, 2000, and Akee et al., 2015).7 
 
Supervised machine learning 
We use a supervised machine learning model to produce alternative measures of the complexity 
of judicial institutions and levels of judicial independence, trained on a labeled set of human coded 
American Indian constitution data by Cornell & Kalt (2000). Their data includes a set of 
constitutional variables for 64 American Indian nations, hand coded using an archive of American 
Indian constitutions acquired from the BIA in 1990. The two constitution measures that are most 
relevant to our analysis include the JUDICIARY variable (i.e. whether there are references within 
the constitution on the structure of judicial institutions) and the INDEPEND variable (i.e. whether 
there are guarantees within the constitution on the independence of the judiciary).  
There is an overlap of 38 constitutions in both Cornell & Kalt’s (2000) data and our current 
sample. We use three different supervised machine learning algorithms (Support Vector Machine 
(SVM), Naïve Bayes and Logistic Regression) to classify which constitutions in our corpus contain 
information on the structure of judicial institutions and an independent judiciary using the training 
data DTMs for the 38 overlapping constitutions.8 We train the models on 70% of the training data 
using repeated k-fold cross validation and evaluate the accuracy of our model using the remaining 
 
7 Table A2 (see Online appendix) displays the Pearson correlation coefficients for every paired combination of our dictionary 
measures. The weakest (positive) correlation is between constitution length and independent judicial dictionary measure at 0.48. 
The constitution length and judicial section length are also weakly (positively) correlated at 0.52. This suggests that there are 
substantial differences between the aggregate amount of information included in a constitution (total length) and the topics them-
selves (judicial institutions). 
8 For the Logistic Regression, we use a boosted algorithm that performs variable selection to improve the accuracy of the model. 
 17 
30% of the data.9 This procedure splits our training data into 5 k-subsets, with each subset removed 
from the sample and trained on all other subsets, repeated 5 times. Each model finds patterns in 
the training data that relate the word count of terms contained in a constitution to Cornell & Kalt’s 
(2000) binary variables JUDICIARY and INDEPEND. Constitutions that the model classifies as 
containing information on the structure of the judiciary and judicial independence are assigned the 
value of 1, and 0 otherwise. We select the algorithm that produces the greatest accuracy on the test 
data to assign binary variables to the 97 constitutions in our corpus.   
 
Evaluating machine coding and human coding approaches 
To evaluate our text-as-data approach and the potential for automated coding procedures to be 
used to analyze the content of American Indian constitutions, we compare our machine coded 
measures to an existing alternative: Cornell & Kalt’s (2000) human coded American Indian 
constitution data (see Fariss Kenwick and Reunig 2020 for a similar approach to assessing model 
validation).  First, we use our dictionary approach to replicate the hand coding procedure of Cornell 
& Kalt (2000) for their JUDICIARY and INDEPEND binary variables that measure whether a 
constitution includes information on the structure of the judiciary and judicial independence. 
Second, we use a supervised machine learning method to replicate the Cornell & Kalt (2000) 
variables by training a SVM, Naïve Bayes and Logistic Regression model on 70% of the Cornell 
& Kalt (2000) data.  
For the dictionary JUDICIARY variable, we follow Cornell and Kalt’s (2000) coding rules 
and create a dummy variable that codes constitutions 1 if the following terms from our judiciary 
 
9 We select a 70/30 split to better evaluate the precision and recall of the model on our test data as it leaves more constitutions in 
the test data.  
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dictionary are mentioned, and 0 otherwise: ‘judici’, ‘judg’, ‘prejudici’, ‘judiciari’, ‘adjudg’, 
‘adjud’, ‘quasijudici’ and ‘court’.10 This is the case for all 38 constitutions in our sample that 
overlap with the Cornell & Kalt (2000) data. For the dictionary INDEPEND variable, we again 
follow Cornell & Kalt’s (2000) coding rules and create a dummy variable that codes constitutions 
1 if the term ‘independ’ is mentioned in the judicial section of the constitution, and 0 otherwise.11 
This is the case for only 5% of constitutions in our sample (2), with the remaining 95% not 
including the term ‘independent’ in the judicial section of the constitution (36).  
To assess the accuracy of our dictionary approach and supervised machine learning models, 
we report the percentage of correctly classified constitutions, the precision (the ratio of correct 
positive predictions to the total predicted positives) and recall (the ratio of correct positive 
predictions to the total number of true positives and false negatives) estimates.  The accuracy of 
our supervised machine learning models is determined by taking the mean accuracy over each of 
the 5 k-sub-samples (for 30% the training data held out for training).  
These approaches illustrate how automated coding methods can be used to replicate the 
human coding of American Indian constitutions in the future. While there is a 20-year difference 
 
10 For the purpose of replicating Cornell & Kalt’s (2000) JUDICIARY variable, we exclude the following terms from our judiciary 
dictionary that do not directly relate to the structure of judicial institutions: ‘justic’, ‘bylaw’, ‘law’, ‘unlaw’, ‘lawandord’ and ‘ju-
risdict’. However, we obtain the same level of agreement when we account for all terms in our judiciary dictionary as constitutions 
that mention the structure of the judiciary tend to include more general terms related to the judiciary. 
11 For the purpose of replicating Cornell & Kalt’s (2000) INDEPEND variable, we do not include any additional terms from our 
judicial independence dictionary as the focus of their coding is restricted to whether there are guarantees within the constitution on 
the independence of the judiciary. Accordingly, when we account for all terms in our judicial independence dictionary, we obtain 
lower levels of agreement as there are many more constitutions in our sample that include terms associated with an independent 
judiciary as opposed to explicitly describing the judiciary as ‘independent’. 
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between our corpus and the constitutions that Cornell and Kalt (2000) analyzed, our sample 
includes many constitutions that have not been amended during this time period – and the 
amendments that have been made do not always pertain to the judiciary.  
The results indicate that our dictionary approach achieves high levels of accuracy, assigning 
the same classification as Cornell & Kalt (2000) to between 82-84% of constitutions in the 
overlapping sample (see Table III). Our supervised machine learning method also obtains high 
levels of accuracy, assigning the same classification as Cornell & Kalt (2000) to on average 90% 
of constitutions in 30% of the test data (see Table IV and VI). Both approaches have high levels 
of precision and recall for the JUDICIARY variable (1 and 0.842 for the dictionary approach and 
1 and 0.9 for the supervised machine learning models).  
However, the precision and recall of the INDEPEND variable produced by both methods is 
low as neither approach is able to correctly classify the true positives identified by Cornell & Kalt 
(2000) in the overlapping sample (i.e. constitutions that they code as containing references to an 
independent judiciary). For the dictionary approach, this is because our search for the term 
‘independ’ is too narrow and only features in a small number of constitutions in the overlapping 
sample. For example, when we search for all terms included in our judicial independence 
dictionary, the precision and recall improve (correctly identifying 80% of the true positives 
identified by Cornell & Kalt 2000) but the accuracy decreases as our models assign the value of 1 
to constitutions that Cornell & Kalt (2000) coded 0. This is likely because the content of these 
constitutions regarding an independent judiciary have been updated and changed over the past 20 
years (since the Cornell & Kalt dataset is based on American Indian constitutions acquired in 1990 
and our sample includes constitutions up to 2010). For the supervised machine learning method, 
these results are likely due to the small number of constitutions assigned a 1 by Cornell & Kalt 
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(2000) that the model is trained on (only 5 constitutions) and similarities between those 
constitutions in the training data assigned a 1 and 0. Both of these results call for more recent 
labeled data to compare our judicial independence measures that could be built using our larger 
AIAN constitutional database and hand-coding approaches.  
 
Table III in here 
 
Table IV in here 
 
Table V in here 
 
These results demonstrate the potential for automated approaches to recover human-coded 
measures and also complement and improve on human coding. Our measures assign a different 
classification to Cornell & Kalt (2000) to some constitutions where content has been added that 
mentions terms related to the judiciary in the main body of the constitution and ‘independence’ in 
the judicial section. In these cases, we find references to the judiciary and judicial independence 
in a more recent constitution for the same tribe that did not exist in an older constitution that 
Cornell & Kalt (2000) coded. Another reason for disagreements in coding of the same tribe’s 
constitution is due to the restrictive nature of our JUDICIARY and INDEPEND replication 
variables. For example, if we only search for the term ‘independ’ we will miss other terms that 
refer to the judicial function and judicial independence (that human coders can detect). Fortunately, 
our dictionary and supervised machine learning method are able to overcome this limitation and 
assign correct coding as they will consider multiple terms associated with these concepts. These 
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results show the potential for automated approaches to code American Indian constitutions and 
validate Cornell & Kalt’s (2000) coding scheme. These findings are impressive given that our 
dummy variables used for this model evaluation exercise truncate the variation contained in our 
original measures, yet still capture something akin to existing alternatives. 
 
Conclusion 
There is demand for better data and measurement of institutions, and this article shows how a text-
as-data approach can be employed to capture variation across American Indian institutions. 
Existing approaches of measuring political institutions relying on hand-coding or expert surveys 
are time consuming and specific to the time when coded, which is problematic when the 
institutions are evolving. We show that content analysis provides a feasible alternative that can 
replicate existing expert-based coding and be easily extended as institutions are revised. Existing 
approaches and text-as-data design need not be seen as alternatives but can complement each other 
and help make data coding more reliable and replicable. Moreover, the methods presented in this 
article can easily be extended to other topics in constitutions; highlighting the value of these 
methods for measuring political institutions more generally. 
 Our database of the constitutions and polities across AIAN nations and the automated 
coding and estimation of institutional variables will allow us to further explore the role that 
constitutions play in shaping various governance outcomes. First, scholars could evaluate what 
determines the content of institutional provisions in constitutions. For our sample, American 
Indian constitutions reflect the public and political discourse and context of the time, and one might 
explore whether more recently adopted AIAN constitutions make greater reference to topics such 
as gender equality, rights for the elderly, and special needs groups. Second, scholars may also ask 
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about the effects of constitutional texts on political, social, and economic outcomes. In the spirit 
of the Cornell & Kalt (2000) and Akee et al. (2015) studies, scholars can investigate how AIAN 
constitutions’ properties affect outcomes such as violent crime, for which judiciary institutions are 
likely to be particularly relevant.  
 
 
 
Replication data 
 
The dataset and replication files for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at 
http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets.  
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Table I. Stemmed terms included in the judiciary dictionary 
adjud, adjudg, bylaw, court, judg, judici, judiciari, jurisdict, justic, law, lawandord, prejudici, 
quasijudici, unlaw 
 
Table II. Stemmed terms included in the judicial independence dictionary 
appoint, appointe, author, compens, decid, decis, disqualif, disqualifi, elect, elector, elig, 
independ, inelig, power, qualif, qualifi, reappoint, remov, salari, select, serv, term, vote, voter 
 
Table III. Percentage agreement, precision and recall for the JUDICIARY and INDEPEND 
replication variable using a dictionary approach 
 Percentage Agreement Precision Recall 
JUDICIARY 84.211 1 0.842 
INDEPEND 81.579 0 0.000 
  
Table IV. Model accuracy, precision and recall for the JUDICIARY replication variable using 
supervised machine learning 
 Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic Regression 0.9 1 0.9 
Naïve Bayes 0.9 1 0.9 
Support Vector Machine 0.9 1 0.9 
 
Table V. Model accuracy, precision and recall for the INDEPEND replication variable using 
supervised machine learning 
 Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic Regression 0.8 0 0 
Naïve Bayes 0.9 0 Undefined 
Support Vector Machine 0.9 0 Undefined 
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Figure 1. Constitutions by year of adoption 
 
 
Figure 2. Constitution length, measured as total word count of a constitution 
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Figure 3. Constitution length (measured as average word count), by decade of adoption
 
 
Figure 4. Length of the section on the judiciary, measured as total word count 
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Figure 5. Terms associated with the judiciary included in a constitution, measured as total word 
count 
 
 
Figure 6. Terms associated with an independent judiciary included in the judicial section of a 
constitution, measured as total word count 
 
 
Table A1: Excerpts from three American Indian constitutions regarding the structure of judicial institutions 
Tribe The Yankton Sioux Tribe of 
South Dakota 
The Mescalero Apache Tribe in New Mexico Turtle Mountain Band of 
Chippewa Indians in North 
Dakota 
Year of 
Approval 
1998 1988 2006 
Frequency of 
Terms Included 
in Judicial 
Independence 
Dictionary 
Least Average Most 
Statement of 
Judicial 
Independence 
None None ‘The Judicial Branch shall have 
authority to independently 
develop its operating budget and 
independently secure funding for 
its operations directly from 
funding sources’ 
Judicial Tenure None ‘The tenure and salary of tribal judges shall be 
established by ordinance of the tribal council’ 
‘The term of office of the Chief 
Judge of the Turtle Mountain 
Tribe and all other judges and 
Chief Clerk of Court shall be 
four years’ 
Selection 
Procedure 
‘The judicial power shall 
remain in the Tribal 
membership and upon request 
of five members for any just 
cause, such cause shall be 
submitted at any regular 
Tribal meeting for action.’ 
‘The tribal court shall consist of a chief judge and two 
associate judges, appointed by the President of the 
Mescalero Apache Tribe, with the concurrence of not 
less than a three-fourths majority vote of the whole 
membership of the tribal council.’ 
‘Properly registered candidates 
for the Office of Chief Judge 
shall then be subjected to a 
reservation wide or at large 
election’ 
Removal 
Procedure 
None ‘Any member of the tribal council or elected officer of 
the Mescalero Apache Tribe who, during the term for 
which he is elected, is convicted of any felony, shall 
automatically forfeit his office. Any member of the tribal 
council or elected officer found guilty of a misdemeanor 
involving moral turpitude, gross neglect of duty, 
malfeasance in office or misconduct reflecting on the 
dignity and integrity of the tribal government, may be 
removed from office by majority vote of the tribal 
council.’ 
‘All judges of the judicial branch 
of government shall be subject to 
impeachment based only upon 
cause, as developed by the 
Judicial Board, only after due 
process of law is provided. The 
applicable standard shall be clear 
and convincing evidence.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Salary Insulation None ‘The tenure and salary of tribal judges shall be 
established by ordinance of the tribal council’ 
None 
 
Table A2: Correlation matrix for the dictionary measures, using a Pearson correlation coefficient 
  Constitution 
Length 
Judicial Section 
Length  
Judiciary 
Dictionary 
Judicial 
Independence 
Dictionary 
Constitution Length 1 0.523 0.747 0.484 
Judicial Section Length 0.523 1 0.837 0.951 
Judiciary Dictionary 0.747 0.837 1 0.781 
Judicial Independence Dictionary 0.484 0.951 0.781 1 
